Why Britain's 'Constituency Link' Is a Myth

It's time to abandon the First-Past-the-Post electoral system

Since time immemorial, it has been claimed that there is a “special” link between a Member of Parliament (MP) and their constituents: a bond that unites local communities with Westminster.¹ It has been accepted that the first-past-the-post system (FPTP) strengthens this sacred constituency link. This is because FPTP allows constituents, in case of underperformance, to kick their elected “rascal” out in the next election by simply voting for a different representative.² This purportedly ensures accountability of MPs to voters, encouraging them to be accessible and particularly devoted to their constituencies.

Unfortunately, the virtues of FPTP in maintaining the constituency link are overstated. For if FPTP is so brilliant at maintaining the constituency link, why, then, do only 29% of the British population believe that their MPs care about the areas they represent? It could be convenient to attribute this to broader trends of declining trust in political parties, institutions, or perhaps democracy itself; nonetheless, it is certainly reasonable to suggest that FPTP itself is an undeniable culprit.

There are four features of FPTP that undermine the strength of the constituency link between MPs and constituents. Firstly, the system structurally ignores the democratic voice of a large majority of the population, effectively “wasting” their votes. Under FPTP, a winning candidate only requires a plurality of the vote to win. Consider Candidate A, B, C, and D. If Candidate A receives 35% of the vote, B 30%, C 20%, and D 15%, Candidate A wins the seat and becomes the MP of the constituency. The majority of the votes obtained by the losing candidates are considered “wasted”.³ In the 2019 and 2024 general elections, only 29% and 26% of the total votes cast, respectively, were decisive⁴ in electing an MP. The consequence, although entirely predictable, is incredibly damning: around 58% of the British voters did not get an MP of their choosing. So, can one reasonably say that a representative, whom nearly 60% of the electorate did not vote for, is representative of the constituents and offers a legitimate “link”?

Secondly, FPTP actually facilitates rather than inhibits lack of accountability through the creation of “safe seats”. It is easier for a party to entrench itself in a constituency on the basis of a plurality’s support at the expense of a large majority. After the 2024 general election, over 100 constituencies remained under the control of the same political party for a century, and 247 had been held by the same party for at least 50 years.⁵ The MPs representing these safe seats grow complacent, and they generally spend less time communicating with their constituents.⁶ These seats are also often neglected during election campaigns. In 2019, only 25% of people in safe seats reported receiving four or more election leaflets or other pieces of communication through their door and just 5% of safe seat residents received 10 or more leaflets.⁷ Safe seats, therefore, reduce voter influence, prevent accountability, and ignore the constituents, undermining the link between the constituents and the MPs.

Third, FPTP further erodes the constituency link between MPs and constituents by necessitating “tactical voting”. In scenarios where the “rascal” needs to be kicked out, the replacement is not necessarily the desired candidate. Because FPTP encourages a two-party dynamic at the constituency level, voters have to settle on a candidate that has the best chance of defeating the “greater evil”.⁸ In many cases, that “evil” is perceived not as the individual candidate, but as the political party they represent. Indeed, in the UK, the focus has largely been on voting for political parties, with the national outcome in mind, instead of voting for mere constituency representatives. As Cox observed, and as still rings true today, “The tendency of voters to vote for parties rather than men appears to be a permanent feature of English politics from 1868 onwards.”⁹

Finally, under the FPTP system, constituency MPs lack any meaningful power and have few opportunities to “deliver particularised benefits” to their constituents.¹⁰ This is because FPTP “manufactures” single-party majorities from narrow pluralities,¹¹ which concentrates power in the executive (cabinet) and produces dominant party structures within the legislature. Moreover, due to high party discipline, members of the governing party are expected to toe the party line lest their whip be removed, thereby limiting their independence. Consequently, when MPs carry out constituency work, this often reflects broader party priorities rather than a genuinely personal relationship between the constituents and MPs. This undermines the purported constituency link because voters value constituency work more highly than supporting the party or the party leader: in 2018, only 12% believed that “supporting their party’s leader” is a primary function of an MP. Therefore, despite MPs engaging in constituency work, it is unsurprising that only 29% of British voters believe their MPs care about their constituencies.

It is reasonable to suggest that maintaining a constituency link is vital as voters expect local service and indeed look favourably upon MPs who dedicate time to constituency work.¹² However, any claim that extols the virtues of FPTP for representation has to contend with and justify wasted votes, safe seats, insincere voting, and the consequences of tight party control over MPs’ representation of their constituents. There are indeed alternative electoral systems that better maintain the constituency link, namely PR-STV, but before turning to those alternatives, it is necessary to bust the myth of FPTP’s supposed virtues.

1. Report of the Hansard Society Commission on Electoral Reform. London, 1976.

2. Michael Pinto-Duschinsky, “Send the Rascals Packing: Defects of Proportional Representation and the Virtues of the Westminster Model,” Representation 36, no. 2 (1999): 117-126

3. Wasted votes also include the surplus votes that were cast for the elected candidate but did not contribute to their election.

4. A vote is ‘decisive’ under the FPTP system if it directly contributes to the election of a candidate. The decisive votes are the minimum number of votes a candidate needs to win.

5. Electoral Reform Society. “Over 100 Seats Haven’t Changed Hands for 100 Years or More.” https://electoral-reform.org.uk/over-100-seats-havent-changed-hands-for-100-years-or-more/

6. Katrin Auel and Resul Umit, “Explaining MPs’ Communication to Their Constituents: Evidence from the UK House of Commons,” The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 20, no. 3 (2018): 745.

7. Electoral Reform Society. The 2019 General Election: Voters Left Voiceless. London: Electoral Reform Society, n.d. https://electoral-reform.org.uk/

8. Politics.co.uk, “Tactical Voting: Does It Work in the UK?.” https://www.politics.co.uk; Electoral Reform Society, “When Millions Feel Unable to Vote for Their Favourite Candidate, Something Is Seriously Wrong.” https://electoral-reform.org.uk/; Bryan T. McGraw and Timothy W. Taylor, “How to Think about Voting,” National Affairs, Winter 2024, https://nationalaffairs.com/publications/detail/how-to-think-about-voting

9. Gary W. Cox, “The Development of a Party-Orientated Electorate in England, 1832–1918,” British Journal of Political Science 16, no. 2 (1986): 188

10. Paul Mitchell, “The United Kingdom: Plurality under Siege,” in The Politics of Electoral Systems, ed. Michael Gallagher and Paul Mitchell (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 170.

11. Douglas W. Rae, The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), 74

12. Lawrence McKay, “Does Constituency Focus Improve Attitudes to MPs? A Test for the UK,” The Journal of Legislative Studies 26, no. 1 (2020): 1–26.